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Abstract: It is not uncommon for humans to exhibit
abusive behaviour towards robots. This study compares
how abusive behaviour towards a human is perceived
differently in comparison with identical behaviour to-
wards a robot. We showed participants 16 video clips of
unparalleled quality that depicted different levels of
violence and abuse. For each video, we asked participants
to rate the moral acceptability of the action, the violence
depicted, the intention to harm, and how abusive the
action was. The results indicate no significant difference
in the perceived morality of the actions shown in the
videos across the two victim agents. When the agents
started to fight back, their reactive aggressive behaviour
was rated differently. Humans fighting back were seen as
less immoral compared with robots fighting back. A
mediation analysis showed that this was predominately
due to participants perceiving the robot’s response as
more abusive than the human’s response.
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1 Introduction
The interactions between humans and robots are not
always positive. Some humans verbally and physically
abuse robots. Hitchbot, for example, was completely
destroyed in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, when it was
trying to catch a lift [1]. Robovie, which was operating in
kindergartens, schools, shopping malls, and train sta-
tions, had to deal with a variety of abusive behaviours,
including people obstructing its way and kicking it [2].
The K5 Knightscope robot was assaulted by a drunk man
in a parking lot in Mountain View, California [3]. How to
respond to this abusive behaviour is a difficult question,
and researchers are trying to run controlled experiments
to better understand people’s motivation for abusing
robots and what the best response strategies would be.
One approach to understanding robot bullying has
been to experimentally study what makes people aggres-
sive towards robots [4–6]. However, experiments designed
so, i.e. participants have to verbally or physically abuse a
robotic agent, may have a hard time passing the ethics
board. In addition, people are unlikely to bully robots
during a controlled experiment, as they tend to be self-
aware and wanting to make a good impression [7,8].
People have been coerced to physically harm a robot [9],
but in this experiment participants were explicitly
instructed to destroy the robots and the robots in question
were very simple and cheap. Therefore, the behaviour
that was measured may have been obedience rather than
robot abuse. It is uncertain whether these results would
generalise to robot bullying, or even obedience behaviour
with a more advanced and anthropomorphic robot. In
short, studies targeting robot abuse are complicated to
design, and researchers often have to adopt a proxy for
abusive behaviour.
An alternative approach is to expose participants to
recordings of robot abuse and measure their responses.
Previous studies have measured to what extent participants
perceived the shown behaviour to be abusive [10–12],
empathy with the robot [13,14], and acceptability of the
abuse [15]. No studies to date, to our knowledge, have
directly compared the morality of the abuse of robotic versus
human agents. However, such a comparison is needed to
place measures into perspective. If a study only observed
abusive behaviour towards a robot and concluded with a
“three-point-oh-seven” on a five-point empathy scale, then
this benchmark is not meaningful by itself. The current
study therefore compares the moral acceptability of human
and robot abuse directly as well as the moral acceptability of
reactive aggression.
1.1 Literature
Humans respond to robots as if they are to some extent
sentient and humanlike. This goes as far as parallels in
how the brain responds to human–human and human–
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robot interaction (HRI) [13,16,17], but it also shows in
people’s tendency to interact with robots in a social
manner [18]. Humans talk to robots [19] as if they
understand what is being said, punish them for being a
bad teammate [20] but also feel sorry for them when they
are being punished [21] and even try to prevent them
from getting hurt [21,22].
Not all social behaviours are positive. Social robots
have been the targets of verbal and physical abuse in the
past [1,3,23,24]. What is even more interesting is that
robot-directed aggression has been shown to be remark-
ably persistent [see, e.g. 6,23–25], and researchers have
been struggling to come up with adequate robot
responses to effectively deter further abusive behaviour.
Robots are in many ways the ideal target for abuse, as
they are in a clear subordinate position, are not expected
to retort in kind, and cannot feel any pain, which
absolves the aggressor from any moral consequence
[26].
This is not to say that robot bullying should be
tolerated. From an ethical perspective, some behaviour
can be deemed immoral even if it is performed on an
entity that is incapable of any suffering, like a robot [27].
Since robots are recognised by humans as social actors,
abusing them might encourage treating humans in a
similar way [28]. More generally speaking, the assertion
“I can do whatever I desire with a robot” rests upon the
idea that all and any actions are acceptable as long as no
one gets harmed [29], which even in the most libertarian
societies is not a commonly shared attitude [28]. And
from a pragmatic point of view, robot abuse can result in
considerable damage to the robot and hazardous situa-
tions for the robot, the abuser, any bystanders, and future
users [26].
Researchers are facing several methodological pro-
blems when trying to investigate abusive behaviour
towards robots. The biggest practical problem is that the
physical abuse could damage or even destroy the robots.
Conducting experiments that involve physically abusing
robots could therefore be prohibitively expensive, unless a
very cheap robot is being used [9,30]. These tend to be very
simple in terms of behaviour and appearance, which would
potentially bias the results and prevent generalising any
findings to more advanced and anthropomorphic robots.
To overcome these problems, researchers have resorted
to less destructive forms of abuse with more sophisticated
robots. For instance, robot bullying has been operation-
alised as reducing a robot’s electrical power supply
[4,19] or using abusive language [5]. Using the frame-
work of Game Theory, robots have also been withheld
points or money [31].
These milder forms of abuse could also be employed
in studies where abuse of robots is compared with abuse
of humans. Withholding money from participants is a
methodology that could still pass an ethics board.
Kicking and hitting a participant are not. Any studies
comparing human-robot abuse and human-human
abuse would therefore be limited to mild forms of
abusive behaviour. Aggression towards humans can be
measured through small transgressions of social norms;
rude behaviour that won’t cause any physical or severe
psychological harm but is enough to slightly sting.
Robots however are not sentient and most people are
rationally well aware of this. Previous research has
suggested that this does not prevent people from
automatically being polite [32], but one could still argue
that a participant omitting any polite conversation or
withholding any reward (monetary or otherwise) from a
robot does so because they reasoned that the robot could
not care less about whether a command ends with
“please” or if it is awarded any payment. Thus, rather
than robot abuse being measured, it could be the
participant’s desire to come across as a rational human
being.
Alternatively, more extreme abusive behaviours can
be studied through registering participant’s responses to
recordings of abuse. Common examples of this method
are vignette-based approaches, where participants read
about abusive behaviour and then express their moral
sentiment towards the actions described [e.g. 33], video-
based approaches, where participants are shown a film
clip of robot abuse [see, for instance, 14] or indicating
behavioural intentions after interaction with a robot [15].
The discussion about whether representations of
HRI, such as videos and texts, could be used as valid
stimuli in HRI studies is ongoing. Robert Sparrow argued
that such representations have sufficient moral value to
serve as a test for the humans’ virtue [27]. Previous
studies have shown that virtual representations of robots
elicit more social behaviour (e.g. mimicking expressions,
feelings of empathy, polite behaviour, and physiological
responses) than audiotapes or text [13,21], indicating
that virtual robots, too, are recognised as social agents.
Li [34] conducted a meta-analysis on papers that studied
the influence of agent embodiment on users’ perception
of the agent and concluded that embodied robots elicit
stronger behavioural and attitudinal responses than
virtual agents. Several studies that had found no
difference in behavioural and attitudinal responses for
virtual agents and physical robots were missing in this
analysis, however [e.g. 35,36]. More recent studies, as
well, found that the perception of and response to virtual
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agents is identical to embodied robots [37,38]. More
specifically, Thellman et al. [38] found that social
presence (i.e. whether the robot is perceived as a social
actor that manifests humanness [39]) rather than
physical presence predicts social influence of a robot.
In their experiment, social presence was not influenced
by the physical embodiment of the robot. At the same
time, Keijsers et al. [4] found that robot embodiment had
an effect on people’s willingness to administer punish-
ments: embodied robots got less severe punishment than
their virtual replica. The discussion is, in other words,
still ongoing. While studies seem to confirm that virtual
agents can definitely elicit social responses, the question
remains whether these are as intense as they would have
been with an embodied robot. That being said, there is
little doubt that virtual representations of robots can
elicit emotional responses.
This was demonstrated as well by the public
response to a video of a man kicking a robot dog. In
February 2015, Boston Dynamics published a video of its
quadruped robot “Spot”. Employees kicked the robot in
order to demonstrate the robot’s capacity to regain its
balance.¹ The video went viral and sparked discussions
about the morality of the demonstrated behaviour [40],
with many commenters perceiving the kicks to be
abusive [30]. In other videos, Boston Dynamics em-
ployees used a hockey stick to remove a box from the
grip of Atlas, a humanoid robot.² The intention was to
demonstrate Atlas’ capacity to dynamically track and
grip a box. Many viewers of the video considered it as
teasing behaviour that is abusive. Boston Dynamics has
since included a disclaimer to their robot videos to
assure viewers that the behaviour “does not irritate or
harm the robot” [41].
It seemed therefore feasible to study how people
responded to robot abuse by collecting their responses to
video recordings of more extreme cases of robot abuse
than would be possible to set up in a lab experiment.
Comparing or even benchmarking these responses to
how people react to humans being exposed to the same
abusive behaviour remained, however, more proble-
matic. Up until now, no stimuli were available that
would convincingly show the exact same abusive
behaviour towards a robot and towards a human.
Comparison studies were therefore often constrained to
text stimuli.
1.2 Current study
On 15 June 2019, Corridor Digital published a video, in
which an Atlas robot was shown as it performed a
number of tasks while a human engineer deliberately
attempted to sabotage them. These sabotaging beha-
viours got gradually more aggressive, until the robot
turned and attacked the “bullying” human.³ The robot in
this video was computer-generated imagery (CGI) rendered;
its motions had been captured through a human in a
tracksuit. As a result, there were two versions of a video
with identical abusive behaviours: one video where the
victim was a human and one where it was a robot. This
unique footage allowed us to compare the perceived
morality of the exact abusive behaviour when carried out
towards a human versus a robot. See Figure 1 for a side-by-
side comparison of the same frame for the human and the
robotic agent.
In the current experiment, participants watched 14
instances of abusive behaviour towards either the robot
or the human agent and indicated how morally (un)
acceptable they perceived these behaviours to be. After
the 14 videos that showed aggression towards the agent,
two additional video clips were shown where the agent
started fighting back (i.e. reactive aggression). Thus, the
moral acceptability of reactive aggression to the group
that just abused the agent was assessed.
1.2.1 Methodological considerations
The original videos showed how a group of human
bullies abuse either a single human or a single robot. A
straightforward experimental set-up would be to show
one group of participants the videos in which the human
gets abused and the other group the videos in which the
robots gets abused.
Towards the end of the original video, however, the
victim starts to fight back. Initially, it grabs the hockey
stick, yanks it out of the hands of the bully, and throws it
to the ground. Later, the victim hits and kicks the human
bullies. If this storyline is retained in the experiment, it
becomes possible to talk about bullies, victims, and
fighting back. It would be interesting to measure
whether the violent acts of the victim fighting back
would be considered as less morally problematic than
the acts of unprovoked aggression by the bullies before.
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defence. We define acts of violence that are a response to
previous bullying as reactive aggression.
We wanted to go one step further than the straight-
forward experimental set-up described above and take the
reactive aggression scenes into consideration as well. For
a systematic experiment, we would need to counter-
balance the sequence in which these two types of videos
are presented. We had 14 videos in which a group of
human bullies abuse a single human/robot, and we had 2
videos in which the single human/robot abuses a group of
humans. One group would see the 14 videos first and the
other group would see the 2 videos first.
However, there are several methodological problems
with such a manipulation. The most obvious one would
be the imbalance in the number of videos. Any reactive
aggression after being provoked on 14 previous occa-
sions would most likely be perceived differently than an
aggressive response to only 2 previous abuses. There are
other confounding factors, like the group size. The 14
videos show a group of up to three humans bullying an
individual, while the 2 videos show an individual fight
against a group of humans. Another confounding factor
is the intensity of the abuse. The 14 videos include
scenes where the bullies fire a gun which would almost
certainly be seen as more abusive than tossing away a
hockey stick or kicking a person. Moreover, a complete
factorial design would be impossible as the human(s) in the
videos can be seen abusing a robot and other human(s), but
the robot can never be seen abusing another robot and there
is never more than one robot in the scenes. Several potential
research questions, such as comparing unprovoked aggres-
sion to reactive aggression for the same agent, were
therefore unfortunately difficult to study.
So we had to conceptualise the experiment in a
different way. Besides the original comparison between
acceptability of abuse depending on whether the victim
is a human or a robot, we also studied moral acceptability of
reactive aggression to the group that just abused the agent.
This was done by showing the two reactive aggression videos
after the 14 abusive videos and measuring moral acceptability
and perceived abuse, violence, and intent to harm. While we
did not systematically manipulate the presentation order, this
design still allows some specific research questions to be
answered.
1.2.2 Research questions
Given these considerations, we were interested in the
following research questions:
1. Is abusing a robotic agent seen as more morally
acceptable than abusing a human?
2. Is reactive aggression more acceptable when it comes
from the human agent than from the robotic one?
3. If abusive behaviour in one agent condition is seen as
more acceptable than the other, is this difference in
acceptability due to a different perception of how
abusive the behaviour was perceived to be?
4. Do the different abusive behaviours cluster based on
their perceived violence and intention to hurt?
Based on the media equation theory [32,42] as well
as empirical evidence that viewing similar (although not
identical) abusive behaviours towards robots and hu-
mans elicits similar neurological responses [14], it was
expected that the abuse of the robotic agent would not
be considered more acceptable than the abuse of the
human agent. Since it was expected that abusive
behaviour to both agents would be seen as equally
unacceptable, it was furthermore expected that there
would be no difference in how acceptable reactive
aggression from the agent was seen.
Figure 1: Kicking a human and a robot in the back.
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2 Method
2.1 Participants and design
The experiment followed a single-factor (agent: human
or robot) between-subject design. Participants watched
(in randomised order) 14 videos in which an agent was
exposed to various types of abuse. After each video,
they rated the behaviour shown in the video clip
for moral acceptability. These 14 videos were then
followed by two videos in which the agent fought back.
These two videos as well were each rated for moral
acceptability. Finally, the participants filled out ques-
tionnaires on mind attribution to the agent, individual
tendency to anthropomorphise, and affinity with
technology.
The dependent variables (DVs) were perceived
acceptability of the videos where the agent was abused,
perceived acceptability of the videos where the agent
fought back, and mind attribution to the agent.
Individual tendencies to anthropomorphise and affinity
with technology were used as randomisation checks.
This study was approved by the University of Canterbury
Ethics board under the reference HEC 2019/30/LR-PS.
In all, 166 participants were recruited from Amazon
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Previous studies have indi-
cated that data collected via MTurk are of equal quality
to on-campus recruitment or participant data from
forums [43,44], with internal motivation rather than
monetary reward being the main motive for participating
[45]. Participants received US$1 for their participation,
which is in line with the MTurk reimbursement custom.
The survey took approximately 10 min to complete.
All participants were native English speakers and
lived in the USA, UK, Canada, Ireland, Australia, or New
Zealand. All participants were Amazon Mechanical Turk
Master Workers. These workers are being monitored by
Amazon for their performance over time. Amazon
explains that “Workers who have demonstrated excel-
lence across a wide range of tasks are awarded the
Masters Qualification. Masters must continue to pass our
statistical monitoring to retain their qualification”.
Of the 166 participants, 5 reported being familiar
with the video material but did not think the video was
unrealistic. Thirty participants had not seen the clip but
thought the material was unrealistic. Finally, four
reported having seen the video before and thinking the
material was unrealistic. All 39 participants were
removed from the data set, resulting in a final data set
of 127 participants. In all, 51.18% (n = 65) were male; the
mean age was 42.57 years (SD = 11.20; range = 25–72).
Fifty-nine participants saw the human agent videos,
while the other 68 were in the robotic agent condition.
2.2 Measurements
2.2.1 Moral acceptability of abuse
We measured the moral acceptability of the aggressive
behaviour shown in the video clip through a single item
assessed after each video. The item stated How (un)acceptable
would you say the behaviour shown in the video is? Participants
could indicate their answer on a seven-point scale which








The terminology for the response options was taken from
work on the dimensions of normative demand by Malle et al.
[46]. Malle et al. validated a scale that held 13 points and
ranged from prescriptions to prohibitions. To keep the scale
readable for participants and avoid any formatting issues that
could occur when an extensive scale would be displayed on a
smaller screen (e.g. of a tablet or laptop), we reduced the
number of items to seven by omitting every other point on the
original scale. Previous analyses have indicated that from 5 to
7 points on (depending on the covariance between the items)
adding extra points to a scale does not alter the reliability of a
scale [47].
Since acceptability was measured with a single item
only, its construct validity was assessed by correlating it
with perceived violence, abusiveness, and intention to
harm. Based on Cohen [48], Pearson correlation coefficients
of 0.6 or higher (i.e. a large effect size) were expected.
2.2.2 Violence, abusiveness, and intention to harm
Participants were furthermore asked to rate each video
on three additional scales: how violent they thought the
behaviour was, to what extent the behaviour had been
intended to harm, and how abusive the behaviour was.
Each item was answered on a 7-point scale ranging from
Not at all to Very much. See Figure 2 for a screenshot of
one of the videos plus the four questions.
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2.2.3 Individual differences in anthropomorphism
After having seen and rated all 16 videos, participants
completed the individual differences in anthropo-
morphism questionnaire [49], which measured their
personal tendency to attribute different aspects of
sentience and various emotions to a wide range of
non-human entities (e.g. natural phenomena and ani-
mals). The original scale includes items that refer to
mechanical entities as well (e.g. robots, cars, and
computers). For the current experiment, these were
omitted since the experimental manipulation could bias
responses on those items. The resulting questionnaire
held 10 questions like “To what extent does a fish have
free will” and “To what extent does the environment
have emotions”, which were rated on a 5-point Likert
scale ranging from Not at all to Very much. Individual
differences in anthropomorphism were used as a
randomisation check between the conditions.
2.2.4 Control questions
Finally, two control questions at the very end of the
survey were included: (1) Have you seen this particular
video before? and (2) How authentic were the movie clips
(on a seven-point scale, ranging from Obviously not
realistic (animated) to Clearly realistic)? Participants who
responded with Definitely yes or Probably yes to the first
question, or the lower end (i.e. 1, 2, or 3) of the realism
scale, were excluded from the analyses.
2.3 Video material
On 15 June 2019, Corridor Digital published a video in
which the Boston Dynamics’ Atlas robot was shown
executing various attempts of picking up and carrying
around a cardboard box under supervision of a human
engineer. In the video, another human performed a
variety of abusive behaviours towards the robot. These
started with what Boston Dynamics had shown in its
original videos, such as kicking the agent or using a
hockey stick to interfere with the grabbing of the box.
Over time, the behaviours got increasingly abusive and
peaked as the human bully shot the robot with a gun.
Eventually, the robot started fighting back and the roles
got reversed. The robot forced its human bullies to carry
boxes for it by holding them at gunpoint.
This special effects video was extremely well done
and fooled nearly everyone to believe that an actual
Atlas robot was used, while it was in reality a computer-
generated model. Corridor Digital used motion tracking
of a human actor to capture the behaviour and mapped a
digital Atlas robot onto the movements to create the
animation. Upon request, they kindly shared both the
motion-capturing footage, showing the human actor and
the special effects video with the Atlas robot (see Figure 1
for a side-by-side comparison between the same frame
from the unedited video and the complete special effects
video).
Each of the two versions was cut into 16 video clips;
14 of those depicted abusive behaviour towards the
agent and 2 showed the agent responding with aggres-
sion to the human engineers. The 14 abusive videos
showed a wide range of aggressive behaviours. Three
scenes did not include any physical abuse but instead
showed verbal abuse, such as “You are completely
useless!” The other 11 video clips showed physical abuse
or taunting.
The resolution of the videos was reduced from
×3,840 2,160 pixels to ×1,280 720 pixels to ensure fast
playback on mobile devices. Video playback speed was
tested before the experiment was run, and no streaming
delays were detected. The videos are available as
supplementary material to this thesis.
Figure 2: Screenshot of one of the videos plus the questionnaire.
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2.4 Procedure
Prospective participants could select the task in MTurk to
read a short description of the study. If they decided to
participate, they were directed to a Qualtrics survey page.
After informed consent was provided and demographics (age
and gender) were assessed, the participants were randomly
assigned to one of the two agent conditions (human or
robot). They were then given instructions to ensure that their
audio playback was working. Within each condition, they
watched the videos in a randomised order. After watching
each video, the participants provided responses on the
dependent measures, before moving to the next video
(Figure 2). After the main experiment, the participants filled
out the individual differences in the anthropomorphism scale
and the two control questions. Then they were thanked for
their time, offered a debriefing, and given the reimbursement
code which they could use to claim their reward at MTurk.
The entire experiment took about 10min to complete.
3 Results
3.1 Preliminary analyses
3.1.1 Exclusion of participants
Thirty-nine participants were excluded due to reporting that
the video material was unrealistic (n = 34) and/or reporting
that they had already seen the material before (n = 9). Of the
participants who deemed the material unrealistic, 23 saw the
human agent video and 11 saw the robotic agent video. Of the
nine participants who reported that they had seen the images
before, six were in the robotic agent condition. Participants
who were excluded had lower levels of individual tendency
to anthropomorphise, M(SD) = 2.31(0.77), than participants
who were left in the analysis, M(SD) = 2.63(0.81), t(75.94) =
−2.28, p = 0.026. Excluding those participants thus may have
introduced a bias to the results. We discuss the potential
biases in more detail in Section 4.1. We chose to report the
results for the data set with those participants excluded but
ran the same series of tests for the whole data set. If the
findings diverged, that is, if a significant effect became
insignificant or vice versa, we reported both the results on the
full data set as well.
3.1.2 Confound check for an interaction effect between
agent and video material
Considering how the abusive behaviours covered a wide
range of bullying behaviours, the possibility exists that
one or more specific abuses would be considered
unacceptable for one agent but not the other. This
would be a confound, as the 14 measures are later on
collapsed on a single index of abusive behaviour.
Thus, we tested for an interaction between each video
and the agent on each of the four measurements. That is,
moral acceptability, perceived violence, abusiveness, and the
intention to hurt. Note that the objective of this test was
explicitly not to look for main effects. Any differences in
perceived violence between video A and video B, or in ratings
of abusiveness between robotic and human agents, were not
considered. Instead, the main points of interest were the
interaction effects. For example, whether people thought that
the behaviour in video C was way more hurtful than the
behaviour in all other videos but only if the agent was a
robot. Without such an interaction, the 14 measurements
could be aggregated into a single measure of how morally
acceptable overall mistreatment of the agent was perceived.
The 14 videos thereby became a representative index of
abusive behaviour.
For each of the four measurements, a 14 × 2 mixed
effects analysis of variance (ANOVA), with the measurement
as DV, the video ID as the within-subject factor, and the
agent as between-subject factor, was carried out. None of the
interaction terms was significant, χ2(13) < 14.80, ps > 0.320,
indicating that it was possible to average the 14 into a single
“moral acceptability” measure.
In addition, a confound check was carried out for the
two reactive aggression videos (i.e. depicting the agent
fighting back). For each of the four measurements, a 2× 2
mixed effects ANOVA, with the measurement as DV, the
video ID as the within-subject factor, and the agent as the
between-subject factor, was carried out. None of the inter-
action terms was significant, χ2(1) < 0.801, ps > 0.371,
indicating that it was possible to average the two videos
into a single moral acceptability measure.
3.1.3 Reliability tests
Internal consistency was high for the individual tendency
to anthropomorphise scale, α = 0.83. The mind attribution
scale too had high internal consistency, α = 0.98. The
scales were therefore deemed reliable [50].
3.1.4 Randomisation tests
Individual tendency to anthropomorphise did not differ
between conditions, M(SD) = 2.61(0.69) and 2.64(0.91) for
human and robotic agents, respectively, t(125) = −0.160, p =
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0.873. Gender was evenly distributed between the conditions,
with the 25 (42.38%) of 59 in the human condition beingmale
and 40 (58.82%) of 68 in the robotic agent condition; χ2(1) =
2.79, p = 0.09. For the full data set, however, gender was not
evenly distributed, with 38 (45.24%) of the 82 participants in
the human agent condition being male and 51 (62.20%) of 82
being male in the robotic agent condition. As gender was not
related to the DV nor the mediator variable, χ2(1) < 0.89, p >
0.344, this imbalance was not considered problematic.
3.1.5 Pearson correlation between acceptability and
violence, abusiveness, and intention to harm
Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated between
acceptability of robot abuse on one hand, and perceived
violence, perceived abusiveness, and intention to harm on
the other. The correlation coefficients all exceeded the
benchmark for a large effect [48], ρ > 0.637, p < 0.001. As
a result, assessing acceptability of abuse with a single-item
measure is not considered problematic for the construct
validity.
3.2 Main analyses
To answer our first two research questions, two independent
sample t tests are conducted. A 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA with
factors “agent” (human versus robot; between participants)
and “aggression” (unprovoked, i.e. by the bullies versus
reactive, i.e. by the agent; within participants) was con-
sidered but would likely have resulted in biased outcomes
for the “aggression” main effects, as the unprovoked videos
were both more diverse and intense (ranging from verbal
abuse to lethal aggression) and higher in number.
The adjusted R2 (Radj2 ) and the Akaike information
criterion (AIC) [51] are reported as indication of goodness-of-
fit for the significant ANOVA and regression models.
3.2.1 Acceptability of aggression towards agent
Participants in the human agent condition rated the videos
as equally acceptable,M(SD) = 2.40(0.49), as participants in
the robot agent condition, M(SD) = 2.53(0.80); t(125) = 1.10,
p = 0.275. (For the full data set, a marginal effect was found,
with abuse of a robotic agent being slightly more acceptable,
M(SD) = 2.61(0.80), than abuse of a human agent, M(SD) =
2.41(0.56), t(164) = −1.79, p = 0.076.)
3.2.2 Acceptability of reactive aggression from agent
Participants in the human agent condition rated the reactive
aggression as more acceptable, M(SD) = 3.74(1.45) than
participants in the robotic agent condition, M(SD) =
2.99(1.33), t(125) = −3.02, p = 0.003; Radj2 = 0.06, AIC =
447.46.
3.2.3 Difference between agents: mediation
In order to answer our third research question, media-
tion analyses on the significant findings as indicated by
the t tests (if any) are conducted. In a mediation
analysis, one tries to gain further understanding of a
relationship between an independent variable (IV; here:
agent) and a DV (here: acceptability of aggression) by
including a third variable in the analysis (mediator;
here: perceived abuse), which is hypothesised to be
related to both the DV and the IV. A mediation model
proposes that (part of) the relationship between the IV
and the DV is because the IV has an effect on the
mediator, which in turn influences the DV. In the current
experiment, this would mean that any relationship
between agent and the acceptability of aggressive
behaviour shown in the video would (partially or only)
exist because the agent would have an effect on how
abusive the behaviour was perceived to be and how
abusive the behaviour was seen to be influenced by the
moral acceptability of it.
Mediation analysis can only be performed on a
significant relationship between an IV and a DV. Since a
significant effect of agent on acceptability had only been
established for reactive aggression, acceptability of
aggression towards the agent will not be considered for
mediation analysis.
For the first step of the mediation analysis, a regression
model was specified with acceptability as DV and agent as IV.
As found in Section 3.2.2, this relationship was significant,
b = −0.74, t(125) = −3.02, p = 0.003, Radj2 = 0.06, AIC = 447.46.
In Figure 3, this relationship is shown in the direct effect
between agent and moral acceptability.
For the second step, a significant relationship
between the independent factor and the mediator has
to be established. Abuse was regressed on agent; this
relationship, too, was significant, b = 1.08, t(125) = 4.13,
p < 0.001. For the final step of the mediation analysis,
acceptability was regressed on both agent and abuse. A full
mediation occurred, with agent dropping as a predictor
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(b = −0.19, t(124) = −0.86, p = 0.393) and perceived
abusiveness taking over as the only significant predictor
(b = −0.51, t(124) = −7.22, p < 0.001), Radj2 = 0.33, AIC =
404.91. Sobel’s test confirmed the significance of the
mediation effect, Z = −3.59, p < 0.001. The difference in
AIC scores is 42.55, which indicates that the mediation
model fit considerably better than the single IV model
[52; AIC differences over three indicate non-equal
models]. See Figure 3 for the mediation model.
3.2.4 Cluster analysis
An exploratory cluster analysis was planned on the 14
videos. We expected the videos might cluster on their
type of violence (e.g. verbal abuse, physical abuse, and
taunting), which would mean the clusters had to be
roughly the same for humans and robots. As an initial
check for this hypothesis, the 14 videos were plotted on
their intention to harm and their violence (Figure 4). The
resulting plot did not give reason to suspect any clusters
of videos. To confirm, Ward’s hierarchical clustering
method [53] was employed⁴ on both the human and the
robotic agent videos. No meaningful clusters could be
discerned. It appears that while the videos varied in how
abusive they were seen, there were no consistent video
“types”.
4 Discussion
This experiment compared the differences in accept-
ability between abuse of a human and abuse of a robotic
victim. Markedly, the video materials that were used
were both of exceptional quality (making it hard to
recognise the robot for the CGI rendering it was) and
showed the exact same bullying behaviour to either of
the two agents. In addition, the materials covered a wide
range of bullying behaviours. As a result, the materials
used were both highly realistic and perfectly synchro-
nised except for the agent depicted.
Four research questions were assessed: Is robot
abuse seen as more acceptable? Is reactive aggression
coming from a human victim seen as more acceptable?
Are there any differences between the agents due to
perceived abusiveness? And do different abusive beha-
viours cluster based on their perceived violence and
intention to hurt?
First, in line with our predictions, no difference was
found in the acceptability of abusive behaviour towards
robots or humans. The participants considered mistreating
a robot to be as immoral as abusing a human. While
this may not automatically mean that the participants
consider robots to be equivalent to humans in all respects
and in all situations, it does show at least that bullying
behaviour is considered immoral, no matter who the
victim is.
Two explanations are possible for the similarities
between the judgements about the abusive behaviour
towards the human and the robot. The participants in our
experiment could have considered the robot to be human-
like and hence rate the abusive behaviour towards it similar
to that towards humans. Alternatively, they could have
considered abusive behaviour in itself to be immoral.
Sparrow [27] argued that negative behaviour towards
robots can be considered immoral because of what it
expresses about bullying and about the character of the
aggressor. In the reactive aggression condition, however,
the participants rated the moral acceptability of abusive
behaviour towards a human different from that towards a
robot. This would indicate that the similarities in
responses observed towards the first 14 videos are more
likely to be a result of anthropomorphism of the robot.
It is necessary to point out that the virtual Atlas
robot shown has no feelings that it could be hurt nor it
could experience pain. The robot’s level of sentience or
its capacity of feeling pain had not been made explicit at
the start of the study, however, so the participants had
no way of telling whether the bullying behaviour had
any meaning or relevant consequences.
The human and the robot only showed signs of
disorientation or malfunctioning in some videos, such as
Figure 3: Plot of the 14 videos on perceived intention to hurt and
abuse, separated for human and robotic agents. The numbers refer
to the video IDs.

4 https://www.statmethods.net/advstats/cluster.html
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stumbling after being spray painted in the face or
staggering to the side as an air horn was blown next to
their head. Only after 14 videos showing abuse did the
agents display reactive aggression. If the participants
would have thought that the robot has no emotions or
ability to feel pain, then they should have rated the
abusive behaviour towards it as less immoral. However,
the participants did not.
The second research question was whether reactive
aggression from a human would be seen as more
acceptable than reactive aggression from a robot. In
contrast to the predictions, this was shown to be the
case. The robot fighting back was considered less
acceptable than the human fighting back. The third
research question was answered by means of a media-
tion analysis. This showed that the difference in moral
acceptability of reactive aggression was entirely due to
participants perceiving the robot’s response as more
abusive than the human’s response. We need to point
out again the fact that the acts of responsive aggression
were identical. What could have caused this asymmetry?
We speculate that robots could be perceived to
deserve protection from harm to the same extent as
humans but are not perceived to have the same right of
self-defence. To our knowledge, there are two HRI papers
that relate to these findings. Kahn et al. [15] had children
of various ages interact with a Robovie humanoid robot
before it was locked away in a closet. Robovie protested
against this treatment. The children were interviewed
about a range of topics, including the robot’s moral
standing. If we only consider the oldest age group (the 15-
year-olds), an interesting pattern emerged. Slightly more
than half of the 15-year-olds thought it was wrong to hurt
the robot by locking it away or eventually crushing it
when it would be no longer needed. The vast majority,
however, did not think the robot should be paid for a hard
day’s work or be granted the right to vote; and less than 1
in 10 thought the concept of owning and selling the robot
was wrong. This pattern – a right to be protected from
harm but no right to autonomy – is surprisingly similar to
what was found in our study. It mirrors the ethical view
many have towards animal rights. While animals can be
considered property and can even be killed, mistreatment
is not allowed. Animal rights has therefore been proposed
as a template for robot rights [54].
A different perspective could be offered by a study on
the trolley dilemma [33]. In this moral dilemma, a trolley is
rushing down the track at great speed and will hit and kill
four people if not sidetracked to a route where it will kill
only one person. People have to choose between not taking
any action, and thus indirectly being responsible for the
death of four people, or taking action and being directly
responsible for the death of one person. In spite of the net
saving of three lives when taking action, most people find
taking action harder than not taking any action. However,
robots were more strongly expected to make a rational
choice and more strongly blamed if they go with the
emotional solution. On the contrary, humans were blamed
more if they chose to divert the train. In this light, the
robot’s reactive aggression could be considered more wrong
as we expect robots to be more rational and less affected by
emotion when choosing to take action, while emotion is
expected to play a role in human moral decision-making.
A third possible explanation can be found in how
intimidating the behaviour was seen. A robot fighting
back might be considered as a threat as robots are often
portrayed in public media as a potential threat. The trope
is that robots raise up against their masters and enslave
humanity [55,56].
Finally, the fourth and last research question concerned
whether the abusive behaviours clustered based on perceived
violence and intention to hurt. For example, there might have
been clusters for verbal abuse, lethal abuse, and (physical)
taunting abuse. In addition, these might have been different
for the human and the robotic agent, as people could have
reasoned that verbal abuse of a human has a higher intention
to harm than verbal abuse of a robot. However, our analyses
could show no such clusters, agent-specific or overall.
Figure 4: Mediation model showing the full mediation by perceived video on the relationship between agent and moral acceptability of
reactive aggression. Note that the default for agent was set at human, so that reactive aggression was seen as less acceptable and more
abusive for the robotic agent.
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4.1 Limitations
This experiment has a few limitations that need to be
noted.
First, the videos showing the human actor were used
to motion capture the movement of the digital Atlas robot.
For this purpose, the human actor moved in a rigid,
mechanical way, which slightly deviates from the natural
human movement. Still, humans need to move in
plausible biological ways and therefore the actor’s move-
ment can still clearly be identified as that of a human. If
the human actor had moved in a different way than the
Atlas robot, then this would have introduced another
possible bias. We believe that the movements of the actor
were sufficiently plausible movements for a human.
A second limitation of this study is that the Corridor
Digital company added some small special effects to the
robot video, in particular in the video in which a bully
shoots a handgun at the robot. In the robot video there is
additional nozzle fire, smoke, and impact indicators. All
these effects are subtle and the drama of the scene
certainly outweighs these minor differences. The human
video also contains light effects that indicate gunfire.
We believe that these slight differences do not signifi-
cantly impact the similarities of the videos. Most videos
were identical between the human and the robot
conditions.
We excluded participants who considered the videos
as unrealistic from our statistical analyses. This might
have introduced a small bias since these participants also
had a slightly different tendency to anthropomorphise.
Still including them would have also introduced another
bias, namely, that of participants who did not suspend
their disbelief. We believe that the latter would have been
the stronger bias and hence our decision to exclude the
participants was the better choice. To have a better
insight into how the exclusion may have influenced the
results, we ran the same analyses once more with the
complete data set. No new significant results emerged and
no previously significant results turned insignificant.
Acknowledgements: The authors would like to acknowl-
edge Jake Watson and Sam Gorski from Corridor Digital
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